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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In docket number 38325, Woodrow John Grant timely appeals from the district
court's order revoking probation, wherein the district court executed the previously
imposed unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, upon Mr. Grant's plea of
guilty to aggravated battery. In docket number 38326, Mr. Grant timely appeals from
the district court's judgment of conviction, wherein the district court imposed a unified
sentence of five years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Grant's guilty plea to possession
of a controlled substance. In docket number 38327, Mr. Grant timely appeals from the
district court's unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, upon Mr. Grant's
guilty plea to domestic battery. Additionally, Mr. Grant filed a timely I.C.R. 35 motion in
all of the preceding cases, from which Mr. Grant timely appeals.
On appeal, Mr. Grant argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due
process of law when it refused to augment the record with the transcript of his retained
jurisdiction review hearing. Additionally, Mr. Grant argues that the district court erred
when it refused to grant his motion to withdraw. Mr. Grant also argues that the district
court erred when it included a victim impact statement over Mr. Grant's objection.
Mr. Grant also argues that the district court imposed an unduly harsh sentence when it
ordered his sentences in the docket numbers 38326 and 38327 to run consecutively
with his sentence in docket number 38325.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Grant was in a fight and being attacked by four or five guys, when he fired a
gun into the ground. (Tr., p.61, L.s.4-18.) The bullet ricocheted and struck a person in
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the leg. (Tr., p.61, L.s.4-18.) Mr. Grant was charged with aggravated battery. (R. Vol.
I, pp.72-73.)

Mr. Grant pleaded guilty to aggravated battery, and the district court

imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.
(R., Vol. I, pp.122-124.) Thereafter, the district court suspended Mr. Grant's sentence,

and placed him on probation. (R., Vol. I, Ls.126-27.)
After a period of probation, Mr. Grant was charged in a new criminal case, with
possession of a controlled substance.

(R., Vol. II, pp.211-12.) The State then filed

another criminal action against Mr. Grant, and charged him with domestic battery,
aggravated assault, unlawful possession of a firearm, and a firearm enhancement.
(R., Vol. II, pp.344-47.)

Mr. Grant's probation officer also filed a report of probation

violation based partially on the preceding criminal charges.

(R., Vol. I, pp.130-131.)

During plea negations, a plea agreement was set in place and Mr. Grant
tentatively accepted the State's offer. (Tr., p.119, L.24 - p.120, L.1.) Mr. Grant decided
to reject the State's offer after learning that the State would not agree to a binding I.C.R.
11 plea agreement. (Tr., p.120, Ls.1-16.)
Mr. Grant's defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel based on an
alleged breakdown in attorney client relationship stemming from Mr. Grant's rejection of
the State's plea agreement. (R. Vol. II, pp.230-31.) In that motion, defense counsel
made the following assertions:
1. The Defendant has insisted upon pursuing an objective that the
undersigned considers imprudent and unreasonable.
2. The Defendant had previously agreed to settle this matter and
accept the State's offer and has now rescinded that offer.
3. The Defendant has stated that the undersigned counsel has not
adequately and competently represented his interests.
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4. The relationship between the Defendant and the undersigned
counsel has become adversarial and the Defendant has [indicated]
he wants new counsel to advise him in this case.
(R. Vol. II, pp.230-31.)

A hearing was held on that motion, where defense counsel

asserted that attorney client communication had broken down and no further
communications could occur.

(Tr., p.120. Ls.5-10; Tr., p.121, Ls.14-15.; Tr., p.124,

Ls.18-20.) The district court asked Mr. Grant if he wanted to be appointed with new
counsel, and Mr. Grant said yes. (Tr., p.123, L.25 - p.122, L.2.) The State agreed with
defense counsel and did not object to the motion. (Tr., p.122, L.4 - p.123, L.13.) The
district court then orally pronounced its decision to deny the motion. (Tr., p:124, LS.514.) In response, defense counsel requested to address the district court, and made
the following statement:
I think communication has [broken] down. I don't think I can communicate
with him.
(Tr., p.124, Ls.15-20.) The district court reaffirmed its decision to deny the motion and
in doing so said that Mr. Grant had caused the breakdown in communication, and that
Mr. Grant would have to "figure out how to communicate" with defense counsel.
(Tr., p.124, L.21-p.125, L.4.) The district court then set the matter for trial. (Tr., p.125,
Ls.13-16.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Grant pleaded guilty to possession of a
controlled substance, domestic battery, and admitted to the probation violation
allegations. (Tr., p.129, L.17 - p.130, L.8.) In return, the State agreed to dismiss the
remaining charges, and agreed to recommend that the sentences in the three cases run
concurrently. (Tr., p.130, L.8 - p.131, L.14.)
At the probation violation disposition hearing, defense counsel filed a motion and
objected to the admission of the victim impact statements because they commented
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about what would constitute an appropriate sentence.
Tr., p.157, L.12 - p.167, L.5.)

(R. Vol. II, pp.387-392;

The district court partially granted defense counsel's

objection in regard to two of the statements.

(Tr., p.159, L.15 - p.163, L.17.)

The

district court stated that it would consider the letters, but it would "strike or redact ...
portions, if any, that are characterization and opinions about the crime of the defendant
or the appropriate sentence, [and will] only consider those portions [t)hat are allowed by
case law." (Tr., p.162, Ls.12-20; Tr., p.21, L.21-p.17.)1
Thereafter, the district court revoked Mr. Grant's probation and executed the
previously imposed unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed.

(R. Vol. I,

pp.149-50.) The district court imposed and executed a unified sentence of five years,
with two years fixed, for Mr. Grant's plea to possession of a controlled substance.
(R. Vol. II, p.273.) The district court imposed and executed a unified sentence of ten
years, with five years fixed, for Mr. Grant's plea to domestic battery. (R. Vol. II, pp.39899.) Additionally, the two new sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each
other, but were ordered to run consecutively to Mr. Grant's prior sentence from the
aggravated battery case. (R. Vol., I, pp.149-50; R. Vol. II, pp.273, 399.)
On the same day that the sentencing hearing was held, July 8,2010, Mr. Grant
filed an /.C.R. 35 motion requesting leniency in the three cases. 2 (R. Vol. I, pp.146-154;

1 The district court never redacted the portions of these two letters it did not consider.
Accordingly, a motion to augment has been filed concurrency herewith, wherein
appellate counsel requests augmentation with redacted versions of these letters.
2 Filing the I.C.R. 35 motion on the same day as the sentencing hearing tolled the forty
two day time period to file a notice of appeal. The pertinent provision of I.AR. 14(a),
states "The time for an appeal from any criminal judgment, order or sentence in an
action is terminated by the filing of a motion with fourteen (14) days of the entry of
judgment which, if granted, could affect the judgment, order or sentence in the action, in
which case the appeal period for the judgment and sentence commences to run upon
the date of the clerk's filing stamp on the order deciding such motion." In State v.
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R. Vol. II, pp.277-78, 402-03.) The district court denied Mr. Grant's I.C.R. 35 motion,

and Mr. Grant timely appealed. (R. Vol. I, pp.155-60; R. Vol. II, pp.279-84, 405-10.)
On appeal, Mr. Grant's appellate counsel filed a motion to augment and suspend
the briefing schedule, wherein appellate counsel requested that the record on appeal be
augmented with the transcript of the October 20, 2006, jurisdictional review hearing.
(Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support
Thereof, (hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-6.) The State objected to the Motion to
Augment. (Objection to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and
Statement in Support Thereof," (hereinafter, Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-4.)
Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court denied the Motion to Augment. (Order Denying
Motion to Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule (hereinafter, Order Denying
Motion to Augment), p.1.)

Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 540 (Ct. App, 1992) it was held that an I.C.R. 35 motion does
extend the time for filing an appeal under this provision.
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ISSUES
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Grant due process and equal protection
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the transcript of the jurisdictional
review hearing?
2. Did the district court err when it failed to grant defense counsel's motion to
withdraw?
3. Did the district court error in err when it admitted the victim's impact statement?
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it ordered Mr. Grant's sentence in
the 2005 case to run consecutively with the sentences in the 2009 cases?
5. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Grant's Idaho
Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence in light of Mr. Grant's
continuing family support?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Grant Due Process And Equal Protection When It
Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Transcript Of The Jurisdictional
Review Hearing

A.

Introduction
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause and equal protection clause to deny an
indigent defendant access to transcripts of trial proceedings which are relevant to issues
the defendant intends to raise on appeal.

The only way a state can constitutionally

preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove
that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal.
In this case, Mr. Grant filed Motion to Augment, requesting a transcript of the
October 20, 2010, jurisdictional review hearing, wherein he argued that, when
evaluating a motion to revoke probation, a district court can considered all of the
hearings before and after sentencing. Mr. Grant asserts that the jurisdictional review
hearing occurred after sentencing and since Mr. Grant commented on his own behalf,
that hearing is relevant to the issues addressed at the probation violation disposition
hearing, and this Court erred in denying his request.
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B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Grant Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Transcript Of The
Jurisdictional Review Hearing

1.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Grant With
Access To The Requested Transcript, Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate Review Of His
Sentencing Claims

The constitutions of both United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 10. CONST. art.
I, §13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Cole
v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cly., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981 ).
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,

132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh

V.

State,

Dept. of Health and Welfare ex reI. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998) (citing
Smith v. Idaho Dep't of Correction, 128 Idaho 768, 771 (1996)).

In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript,

the cost of such transcript must be created at county expense.
I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue.

I.C. § 1-1105(2);

I.C.R. 5.2 mandates the

production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.

I.CR. 5.2(a).

Further, "[tJranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court ..
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· ." Id. I.C.R. 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to be prepared at

county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as provided by statute
or law." I.C.R.54.7(a).
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852
(Ct. App. 1983) (citing to I.A.R. 11).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these
cases.

The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal

protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated.

However, the second

theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for
review.
request.

The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they
In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal

protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. fIIinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendant's "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record,

including a stenographic transcript of the

proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to

9

death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts
themselves. Id. at 14. The sale question before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court.'" Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id.

The Supreme Court went on to hold as

follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.

Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
10

In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency.

In

that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Burns, 360 U.S. at 257.

The United States

Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under
the present standard, ... , they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their
appeaL" Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts.

The

Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendant's could not be
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U. S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal.

Id. at 195. If the State

wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id.
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); state v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.
2007).
Here, an application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a
situation analogous to the facts of Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863). In that case, a
transcript was necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed
without the transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly in Idaho, an appellant must
provide an adequate record or the appeal can be dismissed. "It is well established that
an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate
court can review the merits of the claims of error, '" and where pertinent portions of the
record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial
court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho
416,422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103,105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541
12

(Ct. App. 1992». If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes,
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible,
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[edJ that appellate counsel
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999).

If Mr. Grant fails to

provide the appellate court with the requested item, the legal presumption will apply and
Mr. Grant's claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action alone,
which prevents him from access to the requested items, then such action is a violation
of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer apply.
Moreover, without the requested item there is no way to establish that Mr. Grant
provided new and additional information in support of his I.C.R. 35 motion.

At the

/.C.R. 35 hearing, the district court denied Mr. Grant's I.C.R. 35 motion because of his
failure to provide new or additional information.

(Tr., p.221, L.23 - p.222, L24.) New or

additional information must be provided by a defendant in order for an Idaho appellate
court to review an appeal from an I.C.R. 35 motion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201
(2007). Without a transcript of the requested item, there is no wayan Idaho appellate
court can determine whether the information provided in support of Mr. Grant's I.C.R. 35
motion was new or additional.
Additionally, the requested items are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of
review. Transcripts of the various probation violation admission and dispositional
hearings are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review ALL proceedings following
sentencing when determining whether the court appropriately revoked probation. See

state v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26,28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that
is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire
13

record encompassing events before and after the original judgment.

We base our

review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events
occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." (emphasis
added)).
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection under to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial
proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Mr. Grant's Motion to Augment will render
his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcript supports
the district court's order revoking his probation. This functions as a procedural bar to
the review of Mr. Grant's appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and therefore,
Mr. Grant should either be provided with the requested transcript or the presumption
should not be applied.

2.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Grant With
Access To The Requested Transcript Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due process that the
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
[toJ hold otherwise would to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, 'that
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there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free
government which no member of the Union may disregard.'" Id. at 71-72.
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, (1963), the United States Supreme Court
relied on Griffin, supra, and is progeny and determined that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendant's the
right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of
Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
According to the United State Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel
on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it comprehended the right to
effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,744 (1967) held that the constitutional requirements
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcript has prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of
the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether
there is an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor
of any argument made or either undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Grant has
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not obtained review of the trial proceedings based on the merits and was not provided
with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the starting point of evaluating
whether counsel renders effective assistance of counsel in a criminal action is the
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMNAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION.

These standards still offer insight into the role and responsibilities of appellate counsel.
Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence .... Counsel should
advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcript, counsel neither
can make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal,
nor can counsel consider all issues that might affect the district court's decision to
revoke Mr. Grant's probation.

Counsel is also unable to advise Mr. Grant on the

probable role the transcript may play in the appeal.
Mr. Grant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to all of the relevant
transcripts. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Grant's constitutional
right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of counsel in this
appeal.

Accordingly, counsel should be provided with access to the requested

transcript and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental
briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.
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II.

The District Court Erred When It Failed To Grant Defense Counsel's Motion To
Withdraw
A.

Introduction
Mr. Grant asserts that the district court erred in denying defense counsel's

motion to withdraw as counsel, and thereby forced both defense counsel and Mr. Grant
to accept, against both their wills, that defense counsel remain as Mr. Grant's court
appointed attorney. Mr. Grant submits two separate arguments with regard to the
foregoing assertion of error.

The first argument is that the district court did not

adequately inquire into Mr. Grant's reasoning for his request for new counsel.
Additionally, the district court did not adequately inquire into the actual nature of the
alleged conflict. Secondly and assuming, arguendo, that the district court's inquiry was
adequate, Mr. Grant argues the district court failed to apply the appropriate legal
standards when making its is decision. Mr. Grant specifically argues, that the district
court inappropriately focused on defense counsel's legal capabilities as opposed to the
nature of the alleged breakdown in the attorney client relationship.

B.

Standard Of Review
To determine if the court conducted an adequate inquiry into reasons why

substitute counsel should have been appointed and whether a person wishes to reject
the court appointed counsel and self-represent, should be reviewed de novo.

See

State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711 (et. App. 1997). An abuse of discretion standard is used
when reviewing the question of whether the trial court should have appointed substitute
counsel. State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 11 (Ct. App. 1995).
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C.

The District Court Erred When It Failed To Grant Defense Counsel's Motion To
Withdraw

1.

The District Court Inadequately Inquired Into Both Defense Counsel's And
Mr. Grant's Requests For Substitute Counsel

"The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13
of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel." State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho
586, 594 (Ct. App. 2007). "It is well settled that an indigent's right to court-appointed
counsel includes the right to effective assistance of counsel, but it does not necessarily
include the right to an attorney of one's own choice."

Priest, 128 Idaho at 11.

"However, for 'good cause' a trial court may, in its discretion, appoint a substitute
attorney for an indigent defendant." Lippert, 145 Idaho at 594. "An accused also has
the right to waive court-appointed counsel and to conduct his or her own defense." Id.
"A defendant is not required to show good cause for the desire to exercise that right." Id.
"The trial court must afford the defendant a full and fair opportunity to present the facts
and reasons in support of a motion for substitution of counsel after having been made
aware of the problems involved." Id. (emphasis in original).

This inquiry must occur

even if the district court has "well-founded suspicions of intentional delay and
manipulative tactics" there can be "no substitute for the inquires necessary to protect a
defendant's constitutional rights." Peck, 130 Idaho at 714.
In State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 898 (1980), the Idaho Supreme Court found
that this duty was satisfied when the trial court asked the defendant to make any
statements he desired in support of his motion for substitute counsel. Conversely, in
Peck, supra, this duty was not satisfied when the Mr. Peck was not allowed to address

the court concerning his desire for substitute trial counsel. Peck 130 Idaho at 713-14.
In coming to that conclusion, the Idaho Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
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As [Mr. Peck] points out, this Court cannot discern whether he had
legitimate grounds for his request for new counsel, such as an actual
conflict of interest or a deficiency in the public defenders' performance.
Nor can we ascertain from the record whether Peck wished to represent
himself, as was his right, in preference to continuing with representation
by the appointed counsel. The record reveals no reason for summarily
rejecting [Mr. Peck's] request, as the district court appears to have done.
Id. at 714.

In this case, the district court failed to provide Mr. Grant with a full and fair
opportunity to address the court concerning his desires for substitute counsel. As noted
above, there was a hearing on the motion to withdraw. At that hearing, all the parties
were in agreement that the motion to withdraw should be granted.

Initially, defense

counsel stated the breakdown in the attorney client relationship stemmed from a
disagreement over a plea agreement. (Tr., p.119, L.24 - p.120, L.16.) Mr. Grant would
not accept the plea agreement because it was not a binding I.C.R. 11 agreement, and
the State was not willing to offer such an agreement. (Tr., p.119, L.24 - p.120, L.16.)
Trial counsel then stated:
Your Honor, I felt like that our communication had [broken] down.
thought that maybe if he had new counsel - - because the communication
had broke down and become averse, that maybe new counsel could give
him a new look at this.
(Tr., p.120, Ls.5-10.) Defense counsel then said that he had a fundamental
disagreement with Mr. Grant over the plea agreement. (Tr., p.120, L.21 - p.121, L.1.)
Defense counsel also stated:
[At] his election, Your Honor, he wants to set this for further proceedings,
get new counsel, and maybe if he had new counsel, and maybe there
might be something else they can negotiate with the State maybe there is
something they could work out, but if nothing else, I think he probably
needs new counsel.
If he gets a fresh look at it, maybe they can give another insight ... and
maybe something can be worked out. I'm not sure, Your Honor, but at this
point in time, I think the communications broke down and we're adverse.
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(Tr., p.121, LS.2-15 (emphasis added». The district court asked Mr. Grant if he wanted
new counsel, and Mr. Grant said that he did want new counsel.

(Tr., p.121, L.25 -

p.122, L.2.)
The State then mentioned that indigent defendants do not have a right to the
attorney of their choosing. (Tr., p.122, Ls.4-S.) The State went on note:
In this case, they appointed [defense counsel] and [defense counsel] is a
fine attorney; however, I think there are expectations and situations and
[defense counsel] put in his motion that their relationship is adversarial.
(Tr., p.122, Ls.10-14.) The State also asserted:
[U]ltimately, I think based upon what is in the motion, the Court should
appoint a new attorney.
(Tr., p.122, Ls.21-23.) The State then reiterated this point:
Now, I don't think I have an objection. [Defense counsel] put good
grounds in here, and we want this system to go on and be fair ....
(Tr., p.123, Ls.11-13.) Throughout the preceding dialogue defense counsel, the State,
and Mr. Grant all agreed that the motion to withdraw should be granted.
The district court denied the motion based on its view that defense counsel was
very capable, but never directly addressed the substance of the alleged conflict. The
district court's reasoning follows:
Mr. Grant, you've got one of the better criminal defense attorneys here in
town, and I'm not sure why you would want a new attorney. You may
have a disagreement with regards to what he believes is in your best
interest, but he has a duty to represent you from his perspective in
reviewing the case and presenting all your options.
Now, if your objection is that you want to go to trial, I wouldn't think that
[defense counsel1 would be - - there isn't any better person to go to trial
with than [defense counsel]. So I have a hard time releasing [defense
counsel] from this case just because you have had a disagreement over
what he believes is in your best interest.
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So, I'm not inclined to grant this motion to allow [defense counsel] to
withdraw from this case. If you want a trial, we'll set it for a trial.
(Tr., p.123, L.14 - p.124, L.8.) The district court denied the motion, and then defense
counsel then asked the district court if he could speak.

(Tr., p.124, Ls.13-16.) The

district court granted this request and defense counsel stated:
I think communication has [broken] down. I don't think I can communicate
with [Mr. Grant].
(Tr., p.124, Ls.18-20.) The follow dialogue occurred:
THE COURT:

I don't think it's your fault. 3

DEFENSE COUNSEL:

I Understand.

THE COURT:

That's Mr. Grant. He is going to have to figure
out how to communicate with you and work this
out because I don't see how - - just because
you have a difference of opinion or anything
like that, you can't represent him like you
always have.
I don't have any doubt you are a capable
attorney ... and you've been through these
things before. You're able to represent his
best interest and proceed to trial if you need to,
aren't you?

3 The district court's factual finding that Mr. Grant caused the breakdown in
communication is clearly erroneous because it is not supported by substantial and
competent evidence.
On appeal, "[f]indings are clearly erroneous only when
unsupported by substantial and competent evidence." State v. Kinser, 141 Idaho 557,
560 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing to State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 682, 686 (Ct. App. 1999) .
Idaho appellate courts will overturn a district court's factual findings if they are clearly
erroneous. (see State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 73, 75 (2000). Since, the district court
never asked either defense counselor Mr. Grant why there was a breakdown in
communication and since the district court never actually obtained any testimony or
other form of evidence pertaining to the actual nature of the conversation which led to
the breakdown in attorney client relationship, there is no evidence that the alleged
conflict was Mr. Grant's fault. Accordingly, the preceding factual findings they should be
deemed clearly erroneous and disregarded.
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(Tr., p.124, L.21 - p.125, L.9.) Defense counsel never answered that question and just
asked the court to set the matter for trial if it decided to deny the motion to withdraw,
which it did. (Tr., p.125, Ls.10-16.)
The district court never asked Mr. Grant to explain why he wanted new counsel
appointed. The district court only asked Mr. Grant if he wanted the appointment of new
counsel. (Tr., p.121, L.25 - 122, L.2.) Mr. Grant then answered, "Yes, Your Honor."
(Tr. p.i

L.2.) Immediately after Mr. Grant answered, the district court then asked the

State to comment on the motion to withdraw. (Tr., p.i22, L.3.) At no time during that
hearing was Mr. Grant asked to explain why he wanted substitute counsel appointed.
While defense counsel was provided with an opportunity to explain why he filed the
motion to withdraw and explain the nature of the conflict from his perspective, no such
opportunity was afforded to Mr. Grant.

It is worth noting that in defense counsel's

motion to withdraw Mr. Grant was blamed for the conflict.

In that motion, it was

asserted that:
5. The Defendant has insisted upon pursuing an objective that the
undersigned considers imprudent and unreasonable.
6. The Defendant had previously agreed to settle this matter and
accept the State's offer and has now rescinded that offer.
7. The Defendant has stated that the undersigned counsel has not
adequately and competently represented his interests.
8. The relationship between the Defendant and the undersigned
counsel has become adversarial and the Defendant has [indicated1
he wants new counsel to advise him in this case.

(R. Vol. II, pp.230-31.) At the withdrawal hearing, the district court also held that the
conflict was attributable to Mr. Grant and not trial counsel.
L.4.)

(Tr., p.124, L.i8 - p.125,

Mr. Grant was not able to articulate his side of the conflict.

This is important

because both defense counsel and the State agreed that Mr. Grant and defense
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counsel had an adversarial relationship. (Tr., p.121, Ls.14-15; Tr., p.122, L.4 - p.123,
L.13.)

Had the district court asked Mr. Grant questions, he might have concluded that

trial counsel was pressuring Mr. Grant, or that trial counsel's performance, was
deficient, or that there was no conflict.

Moreover, there is no way to tell if Mr. Grant

wished to represent himself.
In addition to the foregoing error, the district court's duty was not satisfied
because it never inquired into the actual nature of the alleged conflict. As mentioned in
the motion to withdraw, the conflict was triggered by Mr. Grant's refusal to accept the
State's plea agreement.

(R. Vol. /I, pp.230-31.) At the withdrawal hearing, defense

counsel stated that Mr. Grant did not want to accept the plea agreement because the
State was not willing to offer a binding I.C.R. 11 agreement. (Tr., p.119, L.24. - p.120,
L.16.) While this adequately identified the event which triggered the breakdown in the
attorney client relationship, defense counsel did not describe the exact nature of the
conflict. Mr. Grant argues to constitute an adequate inquiry the district court needed to
explore the actual content of the conversations which lead to the breakdown of attorney
client communication. 4

There is no indication whether defense counselor Mr. Grant

were acting hostile toward one another. The record does not reflect whether the alleged
conflict was merely over tactics or had escalated to the point that they were attacking
each other personally.
In sum, the district court did hold a withdrawal hearing. However, Mr. Grant was
never afforded the opportunity to explain the reasons why he wanted substitute counsel
appointed. Additionally, defense counsel explained the reasons why he thought that

Appellate counsel suggests that after the State was allowed to comment on the
motion, it should have been excused from the hearing because this discussion could
potentially require discloser of privileged attorney client communications.
4
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communications had broken down, but the district court never asked about the content
of the conversations on which defense counsel was relying.

In the event this Court

determines that the district court's inquiry into the alleged conflict was inadequate, the
appropriate remedy is to remand this matter for further proceedings. Lippett, 145 Idaho
at 596.

2.

The District Court's Abused Its Discretion When It Ignored Defense
Counsel's Claim That He Could No Longer Communicate With Mr. Grant

"The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13
of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel." State v. Lippett, 145 Idaho
586, 594 (Ct. App. 2007). "Upon a showing of good cause a trial court may appoint
substitute counsel for an indigent, such decision lying within the discretion of the trial
court. An abuse of discretion will be found if the denial of such a motion results in the
abridgement of an accused's right to counse!."

Priest, 128 Idaho at 11.

(citations

omitted).
When determining whether good cause exists:
[TJhe court must make some reasonable, non-suggestive efforts to
determine the nature of the defendant's complaints and to apprise itself of
the facts necessary to determine whether the defendant's relationship with
his or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to the point that sound
discretion requires substitution or even to such an extent that his or her
Sixth Amendment right would be violated but for substitution. Even when
the trial judge suspects that the defendant's requests are disingenuous
and designed solely to manipulate the judicial process and to delay the
trial, perfunctory questioning is not sufficient.

Uppett, 145 Idaho at 596 (citing State v. Vessy, 967 P.2d 960 (Utah Ct. App. 1998»)
(emphasis added).

In other words, the question is "whether the defendant-attorney

conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of communication precluding an adequate
defense."

Id. at 597.

(citing United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1250 (10th Cir.
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2002)).

"A defendant may not, however, manufacture good cause by abusive or

uncooperative behavior. Id.
The district court applied the wrong legal standard when ruling on the order to
withdraw. As stated in Lippert, supra, the question is "whether the defendant-attorney
conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of communication precluding an adequate
defense." Lippert, 145 Idaho at 597. Here, the district court ignored defense counsel's
statement that he could not communicate with Mr. Grant, and instead focused on trial
counsel's competency as a criminal defense attorney. Defense counsel's competency
is irrelevant because the question is whether defense counsel and Mr. Grant can
communicate about the goals of representation and if Mr. Grant can aid in his defense.
In situations where there is no attorney client communications, problems arise
when it comes to making decisions about the overall objectives of representation. For
example, Mr. Grant, not defense counsel, needed to decide whether to accept the
State's plea agreement or go to trial. Preparing for trial becomes very problematic if the
attorney and the client cannot communicate because Mr. Grant is the only person who
can make critical decisions, such as whether or not he will testify. Moreover, the lack of
communication would prevent defense counsel from effectively preparing Mr. Grant to
testify if that was his decision.

In making these decisions, Mr. Grant needed to be

informed by his attorney about the benefits and risks. However, without communication,
defense counsel could not help Mr. Grant in that risk assessment, which is an essential
component of a competent defense. Without being able to communicate with Mr. Grant,
defense counsel was unable to perform his function.

Defense counsel's skill as a

criminal defense attorney cannot overcome this barrier to effective assistance of
counsel.
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In denying the motion to withdraw, the district court abused its discretion when it
ignored the communication breakdown between Mr. Grant and defense counsel and
focused on defense counsel's competency as a criminal defense attorney.

Finally,

since good cause was shown, and the district court abused its discretion in denying a
request for substitute counsel, Mr. Grant is entitled to the vacation of his sentence and a
reinstatement of his trial rights. See Lippert 145 Idaho at 597.

III.
The District Court Erred When It Admitted The Victim's Impact Statement

A.

Introduction
Victim impact statements are admissible at sentencing but are subject to

limitations. One of those limitations prohibits the admission of statements that address
the character of the defendant, opinions about the crime, and opinions about the
appropriate sentence. In this case, the district court struck some statements based on
the aforementioned rules. However, over defense counsel's objection, the district court
admitted statements made by the victim which contained the same type of statements it
had just ruled inadmissible.

B.

Standard Of Review
State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 573 (2008), holds that the admission of victim

impact statements is reviewed for harmless error. The Idaho Supreme Court noted:
The test to determine harmless error is whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the
conviction, and the court must be able to declare a belief that it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt[.] To hold error harmless, the Court
'must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no
reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the
conviction.'

Id.
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C.

The District Court Erred When It Admitted The Victim's ImQact Statement
Article I, Section 22(6) of the Idaho Constitution, provides that the victim of a

crime has the right "to be heard, upon request, at all criminal justice proceedings
considering a plea of guilty, sentencing, incarceration or release of the defendant,
unless manifest injustice would result."

See also I.C. § 19-5306(1)(e). However,

"[v]ictim impact evidence provides only two types of information:

(1) it describes the

characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact of the crime on the family; and (2)
it sets forth the family members' opinions and characterizations of the crime and the
defendant." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 573 (2008) (citations omitted).

"[W]hile

evidence relating to the victim's personal characteristics and the impact of the crime on
the murder victim's family is admissible, characterizations and opinions about the crime,
the defendant and the appropriate sentence are not admissible."

Id.

Nevertheless,

although certain types of victim impact evidence are admissible, if victim impact
evidence is introduced that is "so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial
fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a
mechanism for relief." Id. citing to Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
In reliance on the preceding authority, Mr. Grant's trial counsel filed a motion to
either strike or seal the victim's impact statement, arguing that the victim's impact
statement "contains improper characterizations and opinions about the defendant; and
opinions about the sentence the defendant should receive; and references to unproven
and unfounded hearsay allegations about prior bad-acts evidence by the defendant."

(R. Vol. II, pp.391-92.) This motion was argued, and the district court considered the
victim's impact statement in its entirety.

(Tr. p.165, L.8 - p.167, L.5.) The victim's
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impact statement contains the following statements which were based unsubstantiated
prior bad acts:
[Mr. Grant] ripped a phone out of my hand, and then pushed me down as
hard as he could, all the while calling me names.
(2010, PSI, p.1?)
An example of this and losing out on a lifelong experience is on my Prom
night. ... Anyways, we couldn't go to my high school for the dance
because [Mr. Grant] was a violent felon so he would take me to my
favorite restaurant instead. I fixed up and we went to Johnny Carinos and
had a wonderful dinner. (One thing you leam with [Mr. Grant] though is if
something is going well, he will sabotage it.) Well, we were on our way
back home and I told him I wanted to go out with him and hang out with
some friends from prom as well. He didn't like that at all because he
wanted me to stay home and do what he wanted to do. It escalated from
there and I told him I was going to go out and he could choose to come
and be a good sport or stay home. So he forced me out of the car and I
walked from by [sic] his house to the closest gas station in my dress and
high heels. Not bad enough? He followed me in his car, acted like he
was going to run me over, laughed when it scared me, and then
immediately afterward called me a name and threw a beer bottle aimed at
my head. It shattered the glass on the passenger side of his truck and
glass shards flew all over me, in a Prom dress, with him out of his truck
now inside the gas station humiliating me in front of everyone. "You guys
see this girl, she's nothing but a whore" was one of the comments but the
other one I remember loud and clear to this day is "It's alright. Nobody
would want you and your ugly-ass stretch marks"
(2010 PSI, p.1B.)
I have countless stories I could share with you, but I wonder what it would
take to convince a judge that this man is not a nice person, and that he is
in fact dangerous, and should be put away for a long time .... [Mr. Grant]
called me things like whore, slut, cu*t, loose, ugly, worthless, calling me a
bitch or a baby when I would cry, telling me he hates me or is going to
suffocate me with a pillow while I'm asleep, or make me watch while he
kills my dad and see "daddy's eyes glaze over" ? [sic] Or what about the
countless times he would stalk me, throw things at my head, rip up any of
our memorabilia, humiliate me in public, shove me, spit in my face, make
me cry ....
(2010 PSI, p.18.)
I will continue with one more incident, an incident that I wish I would have
reported but didn't. In August of 'OB, we had been broken up and he was
trying to get me to come over and hang out with him. He talked me into it
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so I met up with him and he picked me up to go to his friend's house. It so
happened that I saw a guy there, heavy-set and unattractive, that I used to
work with and I sat next to him and started talking. [Mr. Grant] because
very jealous (this what he did with ANY guy I talked to) and made enough
of a scene that the guyf,] who's house we were atL] told him to knock it off.
So instead [Mr. Grant] just quieted down and started pinching my back
really hard, telling me I was sitting to close to this guy. He kept doing it
until he pinched me so hard I cried out in pain and told him I wanted to
leave. So he followed me outside and as I was telling him to just take me
back to my car, he grabbed my neck and started choking me.
This night has faded a lot, such as I don't remember all of the details but I
still remember vividly the fear I felt right then and feeling of not being able
to breathe from someone cutting off my air passage .... After that, I tried
to run and he chased after me. I was pounding on a neighbor's door,
praying that someone would answer and help me, not no one was there to
help me that night. He caught up to me and proceeded to choke me
again, all while going through my phone and literally dragging me by the
neck. I couldn't breathe so I couldn't keep up with him and he finally
realized that and loosened up his grip long enough for me to cough
uncontrollably and get to the car. He never once let go of my neck, and
that walk from the house I had ran to, to [sic] his car was the longest walk
of my life. He forced me into the car with me kicking him and screaming
for help, and he had a look in his eyes like the devil had taken over. I
knew that if something didn't change he had every intention of killing me.
He made me drive because he knew I'd escape if he got out long enough
to go to the driver side door. He still had me by the neck after we got
situated and told me to drive to Arbon Valley. When I asked him why we
were going out there all he said was "I think you know why." I don't
remember much about the car ride except for my survival instincts kicking
in, and I know God was with me because I just started talking about Him
to [Mr. Grant] and slowly he loosened his grip more and more until it was
like the fire just left him. He said he was sorry but I was still too scared to
get mad or contradict him so I just agreed with everything he said, and we
drove back to his place for the night.
He tried to have sex with me that night, and ! share this only because I
want you to know how degraded and upset I felt after this had just
happened and he thought that I would want him to even touch me let
alone anything else. He kept trying and I just whimpered and kept inching
away from him until he finally fell asleep. I got up and went to the living
room, and typed a note into my phone saying "if I'm dead and somebody
finds this, [Mr. Grant] killed me". [sic] I then called my fried Sierra and was
whispering, and told her I was at [Mr. Grant's] house, that I was ok and
would call her tomorrow and tell her everything. The whole reason for
calling her though, was so if I didn't happen to make it tomorrow, I wanted
to know where the last place I was so they could tell the police.
(2010 PSI, pp.18-19.)
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Also, the fact that when officers questioned him about having a gun it was
the first question he had 'no comment' and 'I'd like to speak to my
attorney' seems to me to be incriminating in itself. . .. He knows full well
he has time over his head and like a snake, he is trying to slither his way
out of as many issues as possible. I just hope that everyone will be able
to see through his mind games and manipulation.
In conclusion, Woody does need help; he needs a lot of help ... in prison.
He needs to be put away ....
(2010 PSI, p.19.)
Woodrow John Grant is someone to be feared, not respected .. " If I
could have one wish granted though, I would say that ten years fixed is
more than fair for the trauma he's put me and so many other victims of his
violence through. I figure if he gets to serve his sentence concurrent and I
even allowed the gun charges to drop from his plea bargain, he is getting
a pretty good deal by going away for only ten years.
(2010 PSI, pp.19-20.)

The district court admitted this statement in its entirely.

(Tr. p.165, L.8 - p.167, L.5.) Similar comments were made at the sentencing/probation
violation disposition hearing. Defense counsel first objected after the victim stated that
Mr. Grant pushed, spit, choked, insulted, and humiliated the victim. (Tr., p.189, L.14p.190, L.4.)

However, the victim continued to make prejudicial statements, which

follow:
I believe a life sentence would be more than fair for him knowing what he
has done to and others but, unfortunately, sometimes things don't work
out like they should. I would say for the years he put me and other people
in his life through physical and emotional harm, it is more than fair - - at
least the maximum penalty give or take. A few fights spitting in my face,
choking me, calling me filthy names, humiliating me - - and that's not even
close to how bad it would get - - the maximum penalty is more than fair.
All I can say is I will not be around when he gets out. That's how much it
scares me to think of him roaming the streets. It scares me to realize how
many people know him or were friends with him that he believes he should
be put away for a long time as well.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I have another objection, Your honor, if the Court
would just renew it for the record - -
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(Tr., p.192, L.17 - p.193, L.13.) The foregoing contains the type of characterizations
which are precluded under State v. Payne, supra. The victim commented on what she
thought would be an appropriate sentence and Mr. Grant's violent and untruthful
character.
When Mr. Grant's defense counsel filed the motion to strike the victim's impact
statement, he also filed another motion to strike or seal victim impact statements made
by the victim's immediate family members. (R. Vol. II, pp.389-90.) The district court
partially admitted two of these letters, and redacted all characterizations and opinions
relating to the crime, the defendant, or the appropriate sentence. (Tr., p.159, L.15 p.163, L.17.) In partially admitting these letters, yet fully admitting the victim's impact
letter, the district court made it clear that it considered all of the statements in the
victim's impact statement. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the district court did not
consider the objectionable statements contained in the victim's impact statement.
Mr. Grant recognizes that State v. Payne, supra, was a death penalty case and
that prior that opinion the Idaho Court of Appeals issued a series of opinions which drew
a distinction between the use of victim impact statements in death penalty and nondeath penalty cases. See State v. Grove, 120 Idaho 950,952 (Ct. App. 1991); State v.

Campbell, 123 Idaho 922, 928 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466, 470
(Ct. App. 1991). Mr. Grant argues that this distinction is meaningless when viewed in
light of the policy underpinnings of the State v. Payne. As stated above, State v. Payne
holds that H[v]ictim impact evidence provides only two types of information: (1) it
describes the characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact of the crime on the
family; and (2) it sets forth the family members' opinions and characterizations of the
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crime and the defendant." Payne, 146 Idaho at 573.

According to the Idaho Court of

Appeals:
The information conveyed by a victim exercising his or her right to be
heard serves this purpose by relating the victim's personal characteristics
and the impact of the murder on the victim's family. Such evidence is
designed to show the victim's 'uniqueness as an individual human being.'
The allowance of this information recognizes that 'the State has a
legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the
defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the sentencer that just as the
murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an
individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in
particular to his family.' Victim impact information gives the court
knowledge that is helpful for determining the proper punishment and
prevents relegation of the victim to the status of a "faceless stranger."
State v. Leon, 142 Idaho 705, 709 (Ct. App. 2006) (citations omitted). Since the main

purpose for the inclusion of victim impact statements is to shed light on the uniqueness
of the victim, the nature of the defendant's punishment, i.e. death or non-death, is
irrelevant to this policy. Additionally, victim impact statements are allowed to rebut the
defenses mitigation evidence. Since the defense can admit mitigating evidence in both
death and non-death penalty cases, this policy has no relationship with the nature of the
defendant's sentence. Therefore, the protections contained in State v. Panye, should
be applied to non-death penalty cases because, none of the policies behind the
inclusion of victim impact statements are unique to death penalty cases.
State v. Payne used a due process rationale to limit the content of victim impact

statements, but did not limit its hold to death penalty cases. As stated above, "if victim
impact evidence is introduced that is "so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial
fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a
mechanism for relief." Payne, 146 Idaho at 573. There is no logical reason why this rule
should not be applied to non-death penalty sentencing.

In fact, this protection is

consistent with the Court of Appeals opinions in Grove, Campbell and Chapman, supra.
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For example, Grove, held that "sentencing judge may consider in non-capital cases
victim impact statements, provided the trial court does not give undue weight to the
statement whereby the emphasis shifts from the crime to consideration of the 'worth' of
the victim." Grove, 120 Idaho at 952. This is consistent with State v. Payne, in that, the
victim impact statements are allowed to provide insight in to the victim and the
emotional impact caused by the offense. However, the use of victim impact statements
cannot unfairly shift the focus of the sentencing hearing from the defendant. Since the
policies in the Court of Appeals cases are the same as the policies in State v. Payne,
there is no reason to draw a distinction between death and non-death penalty cases. In
both situations criminal defendants are faced with the loss of significant personal liberty.
In many non-death penalty cases, defendants are subject to severe penalties such as
life without parole.
In sum, victim impact statements are limited to descriptions of the emotional
impact of the crime on the family and the victim, and cannot contain opinions about the
defendant, the crime, or the appropriate sentence.

The district court recognized the

foregoing rules when it refused to admit portions of the family members' statements.
However, the district court went on to admit the same type of statements when they
were made by the actual victim. In doing so, the district court violated Mr. Grant's due
process right to a fair sentencing hearing, and his sentence should be vacated on that
basis.
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IV.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Mr. Grant's Prior Sentence In
The 2005 Case To Run Consecutively To The Sentences In The 2009 Cases
A.

Introduction
When Mr. Grant was originally sentenced there was no indication that he

suffered from mental health issues.

However, Mr. Grant's mental health issues

manifested during the period after his originally sentencing and before his probation
violation disposition hearing. Since mental health issues are recognized as a mitigating
factor, there was new mitigating information before the district court when it revoked
Mr. Grant's probation and ordered the sentences in the 2009 cases to run consecutively
to the sentence from the 2005 case.

When this is taken into consideration with the

other mitigating factors is supports the conclusion that Mr. Grant's sentences are unduly
harsh.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Ordered Mr. Grant's Prior
Sentence In The 2005 Case To Run Consecutively To The Sentences In The
2009 Cases
Mr. Grant asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court's decision to

run his unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, in docket number 38325,
consecutively to his unified sentences of five, with two years fixed, in docket number
38326, and ten years, with five years fixed, in docket number 38327, is excessive.
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).

34

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.'"

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979». Mr. Grant does not allege that his
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of

discretion, Mr. Grant must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho
141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 (1992».
The governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are:

(1) protection of

society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.

(quoting State v.

Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Coass%, 136

Idaho 138 (2001».
There are mitigating factors present in this case, which when viewed in light of
Mr. Grant's sentence, support the conclusion that the district court abused its discretion
when it ordered his sentences in docket numbers 38356 and 38357 to consecutively to
his previous sentence, in docket number 38325. Specifically, Mr. Grant's mental health
is a mitigating factor.

In State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 569-70 (2008), the Idaho

Supreme Court held that even in instances where there is no nexus between a crime
and the mental health issue(s), mental health evidence is relevant to sentence
mitigation. Implicit in the foregoing is that the mitigating nature of mental health issues
should be amplified when there is a nexus between the underlying offense the
defendant's mental health problems. Here, Mr. Grant's mental health issues were not
addressed during his period of retained jurisdiction.
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(Tr., p.199, Ls.9-10.)

In fact,

Mr. Grant did not list any mental health issues on his first guilty plea advisory form.
(R. Vol. I, p.113.)

On his second guilty plea advisory form, Mr. Grant listed Bi-polar

disorder and post traumatic stress disorder. (R. Vol. II, p.256.) According to his trial
counsel, Mr. Grant suffers from depression, bi-polar disorder, and post traumatic stress.
(Tr., p.196, L.23 - p.197, L.2.) Trial counsel went on to argue that Mr. Grant was not on
his medications for his mental health issues at the time of the offense, and that his
medications have stabilized him since that time. (Tr. p.198, Ls.1-11.) Mr. Grant was
not diagnosed with mental health issues when he committed the initial offense. He was
not taking his medications when he committed the new offenses. According to his trial
counsel when he is on his medications he stabilizes.

Therefore, there is a possible

nexus between Mr. Grant's mental health and the commission of the offense, which
should be afforded amplified mitigating weight.
Additionally, Mr. Grant's substance addiction is a mitigating factor.

The Idaho

Supreme Court has held that substance addiction should be considered as a mitigating
factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho
89 (1982). Here, Mr. Grant first consumed alcohol and marijuana when he was twelve
years old and methamphetamine when he was fourteen. (2006 PSI, p.1 0.)
Mr. Grant has illustrated his plans to overcome his addiction and help other
people who also suffer with addiction. Mr. Grant plans to attend college and become a
substance addiction counselor.

(2006 PSI, p.10.) The fact that Mr. Grant graduated

from high school increases his chances of Mr. Grant's goal to attend college and
become an addiction counselor.

(2006 PSI, p.8.) While Mr. Grant was incarcerated

and awaiting the disposition of his new offenses he attended the SHARE and
successfully completed the inpatient portion of the SHARE program and helped other
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inmates participate in that program. (01/21/10 Letter from Glenda Bellanca; Tr., p.19?,
Ls.14-19; Tr., p.202, Ls.6-17.) Additionally, he volunteered in the "short stop" program,
and shared his story with young people.

(06/16/10 Letter from the Bannock County

Sherriff, Lorin Nielsen; Tr., p.19?, Ls.20-25; Tr., p.202, Ls.18-24.) Mr. Grant's
amenability to rehabilitation is supported by the outpatient treatment recommendation
he received after completing his substance addiction elevation.

(2010 PSI, p.43)5

Mr. Grant has taken steps toward his rehabilitation and at the same time he has helped
others in the past and plans to help people in the future.
Additionally, Mr. Grant's childhood abuse is a mitigating factor. This Court has
recognized exposure to abuse during a defendant's childhood as a mitigating factor.
State v. Williams, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001). Mr. Grant grew up in a home

where he was exposed to regular domestic violence. (2006 PSI, p.?) Mr. Grant was
sexually abused by an uncle when he was a child. (PSI, p.?)
The support Mr. Grant's receives from his friends and family is also a mitigating
factor. In State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme Court noted
that support of family and friends were mitigating factors.

Despite his troubled

childhood, Mr. Grant has a relationship with his parents and receives support from them
and the rest of his family. (2006 PSI, pp.7-9.) There were various letters attached to
the PSI, all of which indicate that Mr. Grant is a caring person who has support from his

5 There are various attachments to the 2010 PSI. For ease of citation the 2010 PSI and
the attachments have been numbered, beginning with the cover of the 2010 PSI and
ending on page 43.
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friends and family.

(2006 PSI, pp.18-22l Mr. Grant received many support letters

from his friends and family before his probation violation disposition hearing.
Additionally, Mr. Grant has displayed remorse for his actions. In State v. Alberts,
121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991), the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some
leniency is required when the defendant has expressed "remorse for his conduct, his
recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive
attributes of his character." Mr. Grant expressed remorse for his actions. (2006 PSI,
p.5; 2010 PSI, p.5.) At sentencing, Mr. Grant apologized to the victim and her parents.
(Tr. p.210, Ls.5-22.)
Finally, Mr. Grant has proven he can succeed in treatment. Mr. Grant performed
well while on his period of retained jurisdiction and ultimately received a probation
recommendation.
p.5Y

(Addendum to the Presentence Investigation (hereinafter, APSI)),

According to the APSI, Mr. Grant did not receive any formal or informal

disciplinary warning.

(APSI, p.3.) In the New Directions Program, Mr. Grant's peers

recognized him for exceeding expectations on five occasions. (APSI, pA.) Mr. Grant
received a reward card for his excellent performance while on a work crew and was an
assistant in the computer lab.

(APSI, p.g.)

Mr. Grant also initiated the application

process to attend Idaho State University. (APSI, p.10.)
In sum, Mr. Grant has mental health issues which could have contributed to the
commission of his offense. At the same time, Mr. Grant stabilizes when he takes his

6 There are various attachments to the 2006 PSI. For ease of citation the 2006 PSI and
the attachments have been numbered, beginning with the cover of the 2006 PSI and
ending on page 22.
7 There are various attachments to the APSI.
For ease of citation the APSI and the
attachments have been numbered, beginning with the cover of the APSI and ending on
page 10.
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medications.

However, he was not on his medications when he committed his most

recent offenses.

If medicated, Mr. Grant poses a reduced risk to society. This pOint is

supported by the fact that Mr. Grant has performed well while on his period of retained
jurisdiction and while he was incarcerated awaiting his disposition of the new charges.
When this is taken into consideration with the other mitigating factors it supports that
conclusion that the district court abused its discretion by imposing and executing
excessively harsh sentences.

v.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Grant's Rule 35 Motion For
A R~duction Of Sentence In Light Of Mr. Grant's Continuing Family Support

A.

Introduction
The District Court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion for a

reduction of his sentence, in light of the new information indicating that he has
continuing family support.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Figueroa's Rule 35
Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence In Light Of Mr. Grant's Continuing Family
Support
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the

sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent,
125 Idaho 251,253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21 (Ct. App.1987)
and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447 (Ct. App. 1984)). "The criteria for examining rulings
denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether
the original sentence was reasonable." Id. (citing Lopez, 106 Idaho at 450,680 P.2d at
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872). "If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later
show that it is excessive in view of new or additional information presented with the
motion for reduction. Id. (citing State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114 (Ct. App. 1991 ».
In support of Rule 35 motion, Mr. Grant provided two support letters indicating
that his family will continue to provide him support. In addition, his family also appeared
at his Rule 35 hearing as a show of their support.

(Tr., p.221, Ls.3-6.) Additionally,

Mr. Grant wrote a letter indicating that his rehabilitation continued to progress during his
period of post judgment incarceration. (September 23, Letter written by Mr. Grant.)
When this new information is taken into consideration with the preceding
mitigating factors, articulated in Argument IV, Section (8), it supports that conclusion
that the district court imposed an unduly harsh sentence.
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CONCLUSION
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcript and
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which
arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Grant requests
that this Court either remand this action to hold further proceedings regarding the
inquiry into the breakdown in attorney client relationship or vacate his sentence and
restore his trial rights. In the event, this Court determines that the district court erred in
admitting the victim impact statement, Mr. Grant requests that this Court vacate his
sentence and remand this matter to the district court. Alternatively, Mr. Grant requests
that this Court order his sentences in the 2009 cases to run concurrently with his
sentence in the 2006 case.
DATED this 1st day of November, 2011.
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